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SELF-ASSEMBLING NETWORKS
JEFFREY A. BARRETT, BRIAN SKYRMS, AYDIN MOHSENI
Abstract. We consider how an epistemic network might self-assemble from
the ritualization of the individual decisions of simple heterogeneous agents. In
such evolved social networks, inquirers may be significantly more successful
than they could be investigating nature on their own. The evolved network
may also dramatically lower the epistemic risk faced by even the most talented
inquirers. We consider networks that self-assemble in the context of both per-
fect and imperfect communication and compare the behavior of inquirers in
each. This provides a step in bringing together two new and developing re-
search programs, the theory of self-assembling games and the theory of network
epistemology.
1. Introduction
Simple games may self-assemble from individual decision problems. Complex
games may self-assemble from simple games. Games self-assemble by means of a
learning dynamics acting on the actions of individual agents. The outlines of this
theory with some elementary examples have been set out in a series of papers.1
There is also a growing literature on adaptive networks.2
Social epistemology needs to study how information is transmitted through a
social network. Philosophers have been especially interested in the possibility of
premature “lock-in” to consensus in a scientific community that learns too fast—
that “jumps to conclusions.”3 It has been shown by example that this possibility
may be sensitive to the network structure in ways that are not obvious without
analysis.4 This literature compares fixed network structures. Here we consider an
evolving network structure.
Social networks are not just given; they evolve. Here we consider how an epis-
temic network might self-assemble as heterogeneous agents investigate nature and
each other. When successful, even very simple agents may self-assemble a social
network that allows them to be more successful than they could have been had they
Date: August 26, 2016.
1See Barrett and Skyrms [4] for a general description of the theory and examples and Barrett [3],
Huttegger and Skyrms [11], Skyrms and Pemantle [20], and and Bala and Goyal [1] for further
examples. See McGregor [15] for examples of evolved signaling networks in nature.
2See [8] for a recent survey of this work.
3See, for example, Kitcher [12][13] and Strevens [21][22].
4See Zollman [24][23] and Rosenstock, O’Connor, and Bruner [17].
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investigated nature on their own. We focus on reinforcement learning, a low ratio-
nality way of “feeling ones way toward a better network.” This is not because we
think that this is the “right” dynamics. Various learning dynamics are relevant to
this large field, and all deserve to be investigated. We choose reinforcement learning
because (1) it has a long track record applied to interactive decisions, (2) success of
reinforcement learning would suggest that more sophisticated learning might also
be successful, and (3) its degree of success would provide a baseline against which
to measure the effectiveness of other forms of learning.
We consider self-assembly of epistemic networks under two different conditions.
In the first case, information is transmitted along a link with fidelity; in the second
there are transmission errors. In both cases, networks form by means of polymer-
ization, but the different conditions result in different kinds of network structures.5
The resulting networks help the epistemic community in ways that we will describe
in detail. In short, agents in the self-assembled networks are nearly always signif-
icantly more successful together than they would have been had they investigated
nature on their own. The self-evolved networks promote the epistemic goals of the
community and lower the agents’ individual epistemic risk.
2. The basic model
Consider a group of inquirers who set out to investigate nature and use what
they learn for the purpose of successful action. When an inquirer investigates, we
will suppose that she does one of two things: she may observe nature or consult
an agent by asking her what she has learned so far. For the present model, we will
say that an inquirer knows the truth, and is hence prepared for successful action or
to share the truth with others, if she knows how to solve the particular empirical
problem at hand. And she knows this if her most recent observation was successful
or if the most recent inquirer she consulted successfully communicated the truth.
If every inquirer were a perfect observer, each might learn the truth from nature
directly. In this case there would be no point in consulting other agents. But
if inquirers differ in the reliability of their observations, less reliable inquirers may
learn from their more reliable colleagues. We will suppose that while some inquirers
typically learn the truth when they make an observation, others are less reliable.
Given this, the community would do best if those Inquirers who are most reliable
observe nature directly and those who are less reliable learn from their more reliable
colleagues. But which inquirers are epistemically reliable is itself a matter for
inquiry. Inquirers must learn this even as they investigate nature. If they are
5See Barrett and Skyrms [4] for a characterization of the evolution of complex games polymeriza-
tion, modular composition, and template transfer. In the present models, networks self-assemble
primarily by means of polymerization.
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successful in determining who can be trusted, they may evolve a social network
where they are more more successful together then they could be apart.
We will consider five-agent and twenty-agent models where each inquirer is ini-
tially assigned a random, unbiased epistemic reliability in the interval [0, 1]. An
inquirer’s epistemic reliability represents the probability that she will successfully
determine the truth on a particular observation. Each inquirer is also assigned a
social reliability. An inquirer’s social reliability represents the probability that she
will reliably determine the truth when she consults an agent who knows the truth.
For the sake of simplicity, we will suppose that an inquirer’s epistemic and social
reliabilities do not change over time.
We will suppose that the inquirers determine who or what to consult by simple
reinforcement learning.6 It is the learning dynamics that provides the feedback that
may ritualize the individual actions of the agents over time to evolve increasingly
complex games. A central question here is the extent to which simple reinforcement
learning might allow the inquirers to self-assemble a game where the epistemic
community successfully exploits the most reliable observers.
Simple reinforcement learning can be modeled by adding and drawing balls from
an urn. To this end, we will suppose that each agent is equipped with an urn that
initially contains one ball corresponding to nature and one ball corresponding to
each agent. An agent decides whether to observe nature or consult a particular
agent by randomly drawing a ball from her urn. She then consults the source
indicated on the ball. The ball is subsequently returned to the urn and a second
ball of the same type may be added to the urn if the consultation was successful.
The inquirers investigate the world in rounds of play, repeated over multiple
generations. Each generation is characterized by a particular empirical problem
that must be solved for successful action. An agent who knows how to solve the
problem knows the truth. Each round, the inquirers take turns attempting to solve
the current problem by observation or consultation with an agent. We will consider
simulations consisting of 200 generations where each generation has 100 full rounds
of play.
At the start of each generation no inquirer can solve the problem characterizing
that generation. That is, no inquirer knows the truth. In each round, the inquirers
are randomly ordered, and they play once each in turn. A play begins with the
inquirer whose turn it is drawing a ball from her urn.
6See Herrnstein [9] for an early description of simple reinforcement learning. See and Roth and
Erev [18] [6] for discussions of more subtle types of reinforcement learning and how human agents
exhibit reinforcement learning in practice. See Barrett and Zollman [5], Skyrms [19], Huttegger,
Skyrms, Tarre`s, and Wagner [10], and Barrett, Cochran, Fujiwara, and Huttegger [2] for discus-
sions of these and other learning dynamics in the context of signaling games.
4 JEFFREY A. BARRETT, BRIAN SKYRMS, AYDIN MOHSENI
If the ball represents nature, the inquirer makes an observation and learns the
truth with a probability equal to her epistemic reliability. If she learns the truth,
then she is successful in action and prepared to share the truth if consulted. In
this case, she returns the nature ball to her urn and adds another ball of the same
type. Otherwise, she ends up believing something that is false, fails in action, and
is unprepared to share the truth if consulted. In this case, she simply returns the
nature ball to her urn.
If the ball represents agent n, the inquirer consults agent n. If n knows the truth,
then the inquirer learns the truth with probability equal to her social reliability.
If the inquirer learns the truth, then she is successful in action and prepared to
share the truth with another agent if consulted. In this case, she returns the agent-
n ball to her urn and adds another ball of the same type. Otherwise, she ends up
believing something that is false, fails in action, and is unprepared to share the
truth if consulted. In this case, she simply returns the agent n ball to her urn. 7
After each inquirer has played once in random order, the round ends and the
inquirers begin a new round with the same empirical problem and what they have
learned regarding its solution. At the end of a generation, the inquirers start a
new investigation with a fresh a empirical problem and begin in a state of complete
ignorance.
3. equilibrium analysis
We will begin by considering the conditions for a deterministic equilibrium net-
work. We will distinguish between perfect communication where each inquirer has
an unbiased random epistemic reliability in the interval [0, 1] but a social reliabil-
ity of 1 and imperfect communication where an inquirer’s social reliability is also
randomly determined. In the first case, inquirers always learn the truth when they
consult an agent who knows the truth; in the second, an inquirer might consult an
agent who knows the truth but not learn it. After considering the equilibrium con-
ditions for perfect and imperfect communication on a single, simultaneous play of
the game, we will consider what actually happens when one runs the evolutionary
game under the sequential dynamics described in the last section, then compare
this medium-term behavior to the deterministic equilibria.8
On a single play of the game, each agent either consults nature or precisely
one other agent. The combination of the pure strategies corresponding to these
actions defines a network. A Nash network is one such that no agent could gain
7Note that an inquirer might consult herself. If so, she will learn the truth if and only if her
current belief is true.
8We consider pure strategies and deterministic networks in this section. As we will see later, the
random networks that evolve on the learning dynamics are well-approximated by the deterministic
Nash equilibrium networks.
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φ
nature
(a) Perfect Communication Equilibrium
φ
nature
(b) Imperfect Communication Equilibrium
Figure 1. Representative equilibria for perfect and imperfect
communication. In (A), the most reliable agent φ consults na-
ture, while all other agents have a path to φ. In (B), the most
reliable agent consults nature, independent agents (ei > eφsi) con-
sult nature, and dependent agents (ei < eφsi) directly consult the
most reliable agent φ.
in payoff by unilaterally changing her strategy. It is a strict Nash network if any
agent unilaterally changing her strategy would decrease her payoffs. We will take
an agent’s payoff to be her expected return on the single play where the value of
getting the truth is 1 and not getting it is 0. For perfect communication we will
set aside the measure-zero cases where agent epistemic reliabilities are exactly 0
or 1 and for imperfect communication the cases where agent epistemic or social
reliabilities are exactly 0 or 1. Finally, we will suppose that there is always a single
most epistemically reliable agent in the population.
Claim 1. The Nash networks for perfect communication are exactly those where
the most reliable agent consults nature and every other agent has a path to the most
reliable agent.
Proof. If the most reliable agent consults nature and every other agent has a path
to the most reliable agent, then the network is Nash. Consider such a network and
suppose that the most epistemically reliable agent unilaterally deviates consulting
another agent rather than directly consulting nature. In that case, no one consults
nature, so no one learns the truth and the most reliable agent does strictly worse.
Suppose that another agent consults nature directly instead of consulting the most
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reliable agent. In that case, the deviating agent does strictly worse since she has
a lower epistemically reliability than the most reliable agent. If there are more
than two agents, then the deviating agent might consult a third agent instead of
consulting the most reliable agent. If there is a still a chain from the third agent
to the most reliable agent, then the deviating agent gets the same payoff as she did
initially and hence does not gain by the deviation. Otherwise, the deviation breaks
the path to the most reliable agent and the deviating agent does strictly worse.
Note that the only strict Nash networks in the case of the perfect communication
are those with fewer than three agents.
Only networks where the most reliable agent consults nature and every other
agent has a path to the most reliable agent are Nash. There are two cases to
consider. First, consider a network where the most reliable agent does not consult
nature directly. In this case, she would do at best as well as an agent who is less
reliable and consults nature. So such a network is not Nash since the most reliable
agent could do strictly better by consulting nature directly. Second, consider a
network where there is an agent without a path to the most reliable agent. That
agent would do strictly better by consulting the most reliable agent. 
Now consider imperfect communication. Let 1, 2, ..., n index the n agents in the
population, and e1, e2, ..., en denote their corresponding epistemic reliabilities. Let
φ denote the most reliable agent, and eφ = max({ei : i = 1, 2, ..., n}) her epistemic
reliability. Let s1, s2, ..., sn denote the agents’ social reliabilities.
Setting aside the case, for a moment, where there are agents such that ei = eφsi,
there are two cases to consider: (I) there are no agents i such that ei > eφsi and
(II) there are agents i such that ei > eφsi.
Claim 2. The Nash networks for imperfect communication are exactly those where
in case (I) the most reliable agent φ consults nature and all other agents consult φ
and in case (II) φ consults nature, agents i where ei > eφsi consult nature, and all
other agents consult φ. Further, such networks are strict Nash.
Proof. Consider case (I). If there are no agents i such that ei > eφsi, networks
where the most reliable agent φ consults nature and all other agents consult φ are
strict Nash. Start with such a network. If φ unilaterally deviates and consults
another agent, then no one consults nature and φ does strictly worse. If another
agent k deviates from consulting φ, then she either (1) consults nature directly and
does strictly worse since ek < eφsk or (2) consults another agent and does strictly
worse since her chain to φ is lengthened and sk < 1.
9
If there are no agents i such that ei > eφsi, only networks where the most
reliable agent φ consults nature and all other agents consult φ are Nash. Consider
9Again, we will discuss the case where there are agents such that ei = eφsi later.
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a network where the most reliable agent φ does not consult nature. Whatever she
is doing, since φ has the highest epistemic reliability, she would do strictly better
by consulting nature directly. Consider a network where φ consults nature, but
someone else k does not consult φ. Either k is consulting nature, in which case she
does strictly worse than she would consulting φ since ek < eφsk, or she is consulting
a third agent who is not the most epistemically reliable which is strictly worse than
consulting φ, so in either case, she would do better by consulting φ.
Consider case (II). We will call those agents i such that ei > eφsi independent and
all other agents, except the most epistemically reliable agent φ, dependent. If there
are independent agents, then networks where the most reliable agent φ consults
nature, independent agents consult nature, and dependent agents consult φ are
strict Nash. In this case, if φ unilaterally deviates, she either consults a dependent
agent and gets no payoff since she then has no path to nature or consults an
independent agent k and does strictly worse than she would consulting nature
directly since sφek < eφ. If a dependent agent deviates from consulting φ, then
she does strictly worse consulting nature since ei < eφsi for dependent agents and
strictly worse consulting an independent agent since these agents are not the most
epistemically reliable. If an independent agent deviates from consulting nature,
then she does strictly worse consulting the most reliable agent since ei > eφsi for
independent agents and does yet worse consulting anyone else.
If there are independent agents, then only networks where the most reliable
agent φ consults nature, independent agents consult nature, and dependent agents
consult φ are Nash. Consider a network where the most reliable agent φ does not
consult nature directly. Whatever she is doing, as the most epistemically reliable
agent φ would do better consulting nature directly. Consider a network where a
dependent agent consults nature. Since ei < eφsi for dependent agents, she would
do better consulting φ. Consider a network where she consults an independent
agent k. She would do better consulting φ since eφ > ek. Consider a network
where an independent agent does not consult nature. If she consults φ, then she
would do better consulting nature since ei > eφsi for independent agents. And
in a network where she consults any other agent agent, she would do yet better
consulting nature directly. 
Now consider the case we initially set aside where there are agents such that ei =
eφsi. These agents would do equally well consulting nature directly or consulting
the most epistemically reliable agent φ. Hence, agents satisfying this condition
would allow for equilibria that are not strict Nash. Importantly, except for this
measure-zero case, the equilibrium networks for imperfect communication are strict
Nash.
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In the case of perfect communication, then, there are many Nash equilibria like
figure 1(A).10 While all agents are ultimately linked to the most reliable inquirer φ,
it may be by way of a relatively long path. Here the success of the inquirers does
not depend on any particular agent identifying the most reliable inquirer. When
one introduces imperfect communication, however, there is now a single strict Nash
equilibria with a star-shaped structure around the most reliable inquirer as in fig-
ure 1(B) and with independent inquirers consulting nature directly, for a fixed
distribution of epistemic reliabilities, the worse the social reliability of the com-
munity, the more independent inquirers. Here the dependent inquirers all directly
identify the most reliable agent.
The next step is to see what actually happens in the evolutionary sequential
game. Given the complexity of this game under even simple reinforcement learning,
this requires simulation.
4. Perfect Communication
In the case of perfect communication we suppose that each inquirer has an epis-
temic reliability randomly selected from the interval [0, 1] with uniform probabilities
but a social reliability of 1. Each inquirer, hence, will learn the truth about nature
by consulting any agent who knows the truth.
On simulation, perfectly communicating inquirers are always found to self-assemble
a network that allows them to be more successful together than they could be apart.
In brief, epistemically reliable inquirers come to be consulted more often by oth-
ers, while they themselves are more likely to observe nature directly. Epistemically
unreliable inquirers are somewhat less likely to be consulted by other inquirers and
are found to rarely observe nature directly.
Figure 2 illustrates an epistemic network that self-assembled on a typical run
of the five-agent model. The nodes represent nature and the five agents, and the
strength of the vertices represent the evolved likelihood of each agent consulting
another source. Figure 2(A) gives the full graph while figure 2(B) includes just
the most significant edges (with weights above 0.2). On this run of the model,
agent 5 evolved dispositions to observe nature directly, and each of the other agents
evolved dispositions to consult agent 5 with high probability. A network like this
is typical when one of the inquirers is significantly more reliable than the others in
investigating nature. An optimally reliable network would have just the structure
of figure 2(B). Here the self-assembled network approximates the optimally network
precisely insofar as figure 2(A) approximates the structure of figure 2(B).
10If one considers indeterministic networks, there are yet more Nash equilibria as a agent can do
just as well mixing over paths that surely lead to the most reliable agent.
SELF-ASSEMBLING NETWORKS 9
(a) Full graph (b) Most significant edges
Figure 2. Five-agent model with perfect communication
The differentiation in the roles played by epistemically reliable and unreliable
agents in the evolved network can be seen by considering both who is consulted
most often and how the consulting dispositions of each type of agent evolves. In
general, epistemically reliable agents are consulted more frequently over multiple
runs of the model. In the five-agent model, the top quartile of reliable agents are
consulted by the population on average 0.217 of the time, in contrast to the general
population average of 0.164, which is close to the frequency of consultation of 0.167
expected if the population were consulting at random with uniform probabilities.11
This effect is independent of scale. When one moves to the twenty-agent model,
the top quartile of reliable agents are consulted by the population on average 0.058
of the time, in contrast to the general population average of 0.047, which again
is close to the frequency of consultation of 0.048, expected if the population were
consulting at random.
Correspondingly, epistemically unreliable agents are consulted less frequently
on the evolved networks, with the bottom quartile being consulted on average
0.123 and 0.042 of the time in the five-agent and twenty-agent models, respectively.
While one might be surprised that epistemically unreliable agents are consulted
at all, note that, since we are assuming perfect communication, an agent may be
unreliable at consulting nature directly yet become a consistent source of reliable
information by learning to consult with reliable agents. Indeed, in the context of
perfect communication, epistemically unreliable agents typically become conduits
11The cumulative statistics here and below are means for 100 runs of the model.
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of reliable information and may hence evolve to be routinely consulted by other
members of the network.
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the frequency of being consulted and the frequency
of consulting nature as a function of an agent’s epistemic reliability, each on one
hundred runs of the twenty-agent model. Each data point in these figures represents
a single agent at the end of a run of the model.
Figure 3. Epistemic Reliability and Frequency of Being Con-
sulted with Perfect Communication
Regarding the dispositions of the inquirers by type, epistemically unreliable in-
quirers tend to consult reliable inquirers, and reliable inquirers tend to observe
nature. The bottom quartile of unreliable agents rarely observe nature, with fre-
quencies of 0.004 and less than 0.001 for the five-agent and twenty-agent models
respectively. Whereas the top quartile of reliable agents come to observe nature
0.446 and 0.229 of the time in the two models. The simulations suggest that there
is a threshold effect at work here. In Figure 4 note that an agent almost never
evolves to observe nature directly if his epistemic reliability is less than 0.5.
The upshot is that, even on simple reinforcement learning, the epistemic com-
munity typically learns who the most reliable inquirers are. These inquirers observe
nature more often and are consulted more often by their colleagues. And the results
of their observations are disseminated throughout the evolved network.
SELF-ASSEMBLING NETWORKS 11
Figure 4. Epistemic Reliability and Frequency of Consulting Na-
ture with Perfect Communication
The network that self assembles promotes overall reliability. Indeed, most in-
quirers are much more successful in the evolved network than had they made their
own observations. If they were to act asocially and each simply observe nature di-
rectly, their expected success rate would be equal to the mean epistemic reliability
of the community, which, since we are supposing an even distribution of epistemic
reliability of the agents on the interval [0, 1], would be 50%. In contrast, when the
inquirers are allowed to self-assemble by simple reinforcement, the mean success rate
for the community is 0.760 for the five-agent model and 0.786 for the twenty-agent
model. Indeed, even the most unreliable quartile of agents significantly outperform
the baseline, with success rates for the two models of 0.732 and 0.780 respectively,
which is nearly as good as the mean success rate. Those inquirers who are not
themselves reliable at directly observing nature learn from reliable inquirers, or
from inquirers who learn from reliable inquirers, etc.
The reliability of the most reliable quartile of inquirers in the evolved network
is comparable to what it would have been been had they consulted nature directly
with success rates of 0.859 and 0.818 for the top quartile of agents in the five-
agent and twenty-agent models. This is just less than the 0.875 success rate the
top quartile of inquirers would have had they investigated nature directly without
social interactions. The lower success rate for the most reliable inquirers in the
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twenty-agent model appears to be the result of there being more potential sources
of information. On reinforcement learning, these options serve to distract the most
reliable inquirers from directly observing nature more frequently. The most reliable
inquirers, then, do better in smaller communities.
But there is a significant tradeoff. The larger the community, the broader the
dissemination of knowledge. Further, other things being equal, more agents means
a better the chance of there being exceptionally gifted inquirers. This matters since
the community’s average success rate is largely a function of the epistemic reliability
of the most reliable inquirers. The most reliable inquirers evolve to observe nature
directly, and are most often consulted by their colleagues in the evolved network. It
is their success that drives the success of the community. This is seen in the fact that
the correlation between the epistemic reliability of the most reliable investigator in
the community and a typical agent’s success rate is 0.704 while the correlation
between a typical agent’s reliability and that agent’s success rate is just 0.200 in
the twenty-agent model.
The reliability of each agent is randomly drawn with uniform probabilities over
the unit interval. Let the reliability of an agent i be Xi, and let Xmax be the
reliability of the most reliable agent in the community. For a community of N
agents, Xmax = sup{Xi} for i = 1, 2, . . . , N . So Pr(Xmax ≤ x) = Pr(Xmax ≤
x, i = 1, 2, . . . , N), since, if the most reliable agent has a reliability less than x, so
do the rest of the agents. The reliability values are independent and identically
distributed, so the cumulative distribution function is
Pr(Xmax ≤ x) =
N∏
i=1
Pr(Xi ≤ x) = xN .
And the probability density function is NxN−1, by differentiation. Integrating over
the interval, the expected value of Xmax is
E[X] =
∫ 1
0
x(NxN−1)dx =
∫ 1
0
NxNdx =
N
N + 1
.
The expected maximum epistemic reliability for an agent in the five- and twenty-
agent models, then, is 56 ≈ 0.833 and 2021 ≈ 0.952 respectively. The mean success
rates of the two models after 200 generations 0.760 and 0.786 are both well below
these bounds, but the difference suggests that the expected epistemic reliability of
the most reliable agents in the larger community ultimately helps more than the
distractions of the larger community hurt.12
12Note that it is the actual reliability of the most reliable agents in practice that matters, not
their innate epistemic reliability. If the increased distractions faced by the most reliable inquirers
undermine their de facto reliability, this, in turn, undermines the reliability of the entire commu-
nity.
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Figure 4 shows the evolution of the population success rate for the twenty-agent
model and the five-agent model as the networks self-assemble over 200 generations.
Population Mean Success Rate Over Time (Perfect Communication)
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Figure 5. Mean Population Success Rate Over Time
That said, the increased distractions of a larger community undermines the relia-
bility of the most reliable inquirers. The top quartile of reliable inquirers do better
in the five-agent model than in the twenty, but they do not do as well as they
would on their own since they still face distractions from less reliable colleagues
in the smaller community. While one might be tempted to think of the difference
between their success rate in the evolved network and the success rate they would
enjoy on their own as a sacrifice for the sake of the epistemic good of the commu-
nity, this would be to miss a significant point. Before inquiry, no one knows who
is reliable and who is not. Indeed, given human nature as we find it, unreliable
inquirers may well think themselves to be among the most reliable.13 Given this,
the difference between the success rate of the most reliable inquirers in the evolved
network and the success rate they would have if they investigated nature on their
own is better thought of as the cost of finding out that they were in fact the most
reliable inquirers and of being assured along the way that they will do nearly as
well as their most reliable colleagues even if it turns out that they are not.
If the most reliable inquirers learn that they are in fact the most reliable, perhaps
by noting the role they come to play in inquiry, they will benefit less from the
13See Kruger and Dunning [14] for evidence that suggests that both competent and incompetent
agents are incompetent at assessing their own relative competence. The incompetent tend to
believe they are better than they are, and the competent tend to believe that they are worse than
they are.
14 JEFFREY A. BARRETT, BRIAN SKYRMS, AYDIN MOHSENI
insurance provided by the self-assembled social network. The most reliable agents
may continue serving the epistemic goals of community if they gain something from
their role in the evolved network that compensates for the distractions that comes
with their interactions. Given that the expected cost of participation is small, if
there were a small payoff for being an oft-consulted agent, that might keep the most
talented inquirers engaged in the network. This suggests a positive role for fame in
maintaining the stability of a successful epistemic network.14
It is also worth noting that even the most talented inquirers might find good
reason to continue to serve as active members of an epistemic community under the
plausible assumption that no single type of reliability is sufficient to address every
problem posed by nature. The basic model might be extended to investigate this
by providing the agents with various types of epistemic reliability, each appropriate
to a corresponding type of problem that nature may present.15
5. Imperfect Communication
The evolution of the social network is more subtle when one allows for social
reliabilities less than 1. We will suppose here that each agent is also randomly
assigned a social reliability in the interval [0.5, 1] with uniform probability at the
beginning of each run of the model. The resulting imperfect communication might
represent poor eavesdropping abilities, a tendency toward misunderstanding, or just
recurrent failures to convince agents to report their results truthfully.16
While the average population success rate declines with imperfect communica-
tion, the success rate of the most epistemically reliable agents is barely diminished.
The most epistemically reliable agents are still consulting nature and doing as well
as they would in the context of perfect communication, or, for that matter, on their
own.
14There are, of course, other factors one might consider. An epistemic community might thrive
even after losing its most talented inquirers if there were a regular source of new inquirers and
if the community could learn to identify which new inquirers were reliable. Or nature may pose
problems that require different types of expertise to resolve such that no agent might be entirely
successful alone. Such considerations suggest extensions of the present model.
15One would expect a more flexible learning dynamics like win-stay/lose-randomize to outperform
simple reinforcement learning on such a model inasmuch as the inquirers must learn which of their
colleagues are most reliable for each type of problem and learn to consult those colleagues whenever
that type of problem is presented by nature. A hybrid learning dynamics like win-stay/lose-
randomize with reinforcement might be particularly well-suited to this task. The thought is that
the reinforcement part of the dynamics might evolve to track the overall epistemic reliability of the
agents while the flexibility of win-stay/lose-randomize would allow the inquirers to find quickly
from among the most reliable agents those agents who have the right type of reliability for the
current problem posed by nature. See [2] for a discussion of low-rationality hybrid learning.
16Note that the agents’ expected epistemic reliability is higher than their social reliability since
the former is selected over the interval [0, 1] and the latter over the interval [0.5,1]. On simulation,
lower expected social reliabilities lead to the evolution of more independent inquirers since there are
more agents who do better investigating nature on their own than consulting the most epistemically
reliable agents.
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For the range of social reliabilities we are considering, the average population
success rates for the five-agent and twenty-agent models decrease from 0.760 to
0.637 and from 0.786 to 0.647 respectively. That said, the success rates for the top
quartile of epistemically reliable agents stay relatively stable at 0.846 and 0.824
compared to 0.859 and 0.818 in the case of perfect communication. The bottom
quartile of epistemically unreliable inquirers, on the other hand, suffer a significant
drop in reliability in the evolved network from 0.732 and 0.780, to 0.584 and 0.556.
Of course, this is nevertheless much better than the 0.125 success rate these agents
would expect observing nature on their own.
The net effect of imperfect communication is to shift the evolved network toward
a greater reliance on directly consulting nature and on consulting those agents
directly who reliably observe nature. In the case of imperfect communication, the
average relative frequency for a typical agent being consulted drops from 0.164
to 0.104 and from 0.047 to 0.033 in the five-agent and twenty-population models
respectively. Epistemically reliable agents, however, experience an increase in the
relative frequency of being consulted. Specifically, the relative frequency of being
consulted for the top quartile of epistemically reliable agents increases from 0.217
to 0.226 and from 0.058 to 0.093 in the two models, while the relative frequencies
for the bottom quartile drop significantly from 0.123 to 0.025 and 0.042 to 0.011.
This effect can be seen in the comparison of Figures 3 and 6.
With imperfect communication, longer signaling chains are less reliable as each
link compounds the possibility of error, hence consulting directly with the most epis-
temically reliable agents becomes comparatively more attractive and such agents
attract the attention of their colleagues. Indeed, in the case of imperfect commu-
nication, finding someone who is good at consulting nature directly and learning
from them directly is the best way to learn the truth for inquirers who are not
themselves good at observing. In contrast, the best inquirers might remain rela-
tive anonymous in the context of perfect communication since the reliable results
of their observations are widely available from even unreliable agents if they are
well-connected to reliable agents.
While imperfect communication leads to a modest increase in the relative con-
sultation rate of the most reliable agents, there is an order-of-magnitude, absolute
increase in direct investigations of nature. This is clearly seen by comparing Fig-
ures 4 and 7. Here the average frequency of consulting nature increases from 0.178
to 0.479 and 0.069 to 0.346 in the five-agent and twenty-agent models. The fre-
quency of consulting nature for the top quartile of epistemically reliable inquirers
increases from 0.446 to 0.879 and 0.229 to 0.818, nearly doubling and quadrupling
for the two models. In short, when communication is imperfect, the most epistem-
ically reliable inquirers almost always observe nature directly. More generally, any
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Figure 6. Epistemic Reliability and Frequency of Being Con-
sulted with Imperfect Communication
inquirer whose epistemic reliably is higher then their social reliability does better
observing nature directly.
In the context of imperfect communication, the inquirers in a signaling chain
will only be successful if the initial inquirer is epistemically reliable and either
everyone else is socially reliable or the chain is very short. Consequently, inquirers
tend either to observe nature directly or to learn directly from reliable inquirers who
themselves investigate nature directly. The effect of imperfect communication, then,
is to shorten signaling chains and to increase the breadth of direct investigations
of nature. As a result, a network that self-assembles in the context of unreliable
communication, and is hence less successful overall, might nevertheless be more
resilient inasmuch as the degree of success the community achieves depends on the
direct investigations of a broader collection of inquirers.
Given the range of social reliabilities considered here, the resulting network typ-
ically exhibits a star structure with a few central reliable agents and everyone else
linked to those central agents.17 Figure 8 illustrates a typical structure for the five-
agent model. Figure 8(A) gives the full graph while figure 8(B) includes just the
most significant edges (with weights above 0.2). The networks that self-assemble
17If one allows for a broader range of social reliabilities, one sees an increasing number of inquirers
with low social reliabilities evolve to consult nature directly.
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Figure 7. Epistemic Reliability and Frequency of Consulting Na-
ture with Imperfect Communication
with imperfect communication contrast with those that evolve in the case of perfect
communication, as illustrated in figure 2, by exhibiting a compact star structure
with shorter signaling chains. On the simulation illustrated by figure 8, agent 4
was significantly more epistemically reliable than the other agents. When the reli-
ability of the most reliable agents is close, the star structure may form around two
or more agents. Such composite star structures, however, are corresponding less
likely.18 Again, the network that self-assembles here is optimal insofar as figure 8(A)
approximates the structure of figure 8(B).
With imperfect communication, the community must directly identify the most
epistemically reliable inquirers since agents cannot count on the reliable dissem-
ination of information. Here the most reliable agents are directly consulted the
most often. They have evolved a reputation for reliability and play a central role
in inquiry.
18See [7] for an extension of the Bala-Goyal model [1] where heterogeneous agents typically evolve
networks with star structures. On that model, as here, the networks typically form around a
“high-value” agent who helps to ensure the stability and efficiency of the evolving network. In the
present model, the type of star structure that results is due to imperfect communication making
it likely that agents will link to the most epistemically reliable agents directly.
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(a) Full graph (b) Most significant edges
Figure 8. Five-agent model with imperfect communication
Perhaps unsurprisingly, socially reliable inquirers are on average consulted more
frequently than socially unreliable inquirers. However, the impact of social relia-
bility on the frequency of being consulted is somewhat less significant than that
of epistemic reliability. The top quartile of socially reliable inquirers are consulted
by the population on average 0.140 and 0.047 of the time for the five-agent and
twenty-agent models. in contrast, the bottom quartile of socially reliable inquirers
were consulted by the population on average 0.083 and 0.023 of the time in the two
models, for a factor of about two difference.
Considering the dispositions of the inquirers by type, socially reliable inquirers
are on average more likely than other agents to consult their peers, while socially
unreliable inquirers are more likely to observe nature directly. This effect is signifi-
cant. The top quartile of socially reliable inquirers observe nature on average only
0.371 and 0.237 of the time and their peers the rest of the time, in the five-agent and
twenty-agent models. Such inquirers do best by finding the most epistemically reli-
able inquirers, then using their social skills to glean reliable information from them.
The bottom quartile of socially unreliable agents observe nature more frequently,
at an average of 0.619 and 0.476 of the time, and their peers correspondingly less in
the two models. Socially unreliable agents are sometimes most successful observing
nature for themselves since they cannot reliably learn the results of even the most
talented observers.
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6. Discussion
The modeled inquirers start by consulting each possible source of information
indiscriminately. As they learn from their experience, however, they self-assemble
a network by polymerization where they play mixed strategies that strongly favor
consulting the most reliable inquirers or inquirers who are reliably connected to the
most reliable inquirers. Typical inquirers in the self-assembled network do much
better together than they could possibly do apart.
In the case of perfect communication, any agent, no matter how epistemically
unreliable, may come to be a reliable source of information by finding a reliable
inquirer to consult. This allows for arbitrarily long signaling chains. In the case of
imperfect communication, however, the length of the signaling chains goes down and
inquirers tend to either investigate nature directly or consult the most epistemically
reliable inquirers directly.
In each case, the most reliable inquirers tend to observe nature directly, the
most unreliable agents are rarely found to observe nature directly, and the most
epistemically and socially reliable agents form the core of the resulting networks.
While socially reliable inquirers are on average consulted more frequently than
socially unreliable inquirers, the impact of social reliability on the frequency of
being consulted is much less significant than that of epistemic reliability.
Imperfect communication leads the epistemic community to identify the most
epistemically reliable inquirers, and these agents are directly consulted the most
often. They are central to inquiry and famous for their reliability within the com-
munity.
There are epistemic trade-offs in the number of inquirers in the epistemic com-
munity. The more inquirers there are, the broader the dissemination of knowledge.
A larger community also means a greater the chance that there will be exceptionally
gifted inquirers who might drive higher levels of success for everyone. But more in-
quirers also means more potential distractions for the most reliable inquirers, and,
inasmuch as they drive the epistemic success of the community, what is bad for
them is bad for everyone.
While the most talented observers may end up consulting less reliable inquirers
from time to time in a self-assembled network, they nevertheless do nearly as well
as they would had they been identified at the beginning of inquiry and allowed to
observe nature without the distractions of their less competent colleagues. They
might have done slightly better on their own, however, does not mean that they do
not benefit from being a part of the general epistemic community.
In a community of heterogeneous agents, one must learn who is best at what
in order to take advantage of differences in epistemic competence. And, insofar as
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they are risk averse, learning this benefits even the most reliable agents. In the case
of perfect communication, the most reliable inquirers pay a small cost in reliability
for being a part of the evolving network, but the option is a situation where nearly
everyone in the community does much worse. Consequently, insofar as the inquirers
themselves do not know up front how reliable they are, the possibility of evolving
a reliable network significantly limits each inquirer’s personal epistemic risk. And
the self-assembled network is only reliable when the inquirers learn what roles they
are well-suited for and learn to play those roles. The present model shows how such
a network may evolve by means of the simple reinforcement learning of individual
agents.
The simulation results for both perfect and imperfect communication agree well
with the equilibrium analysis. In particular, the random networks that evolve on
simulation are well approximated by the deterministic Nash networks characterized
in claims 1 and 2. This can be seen graphically by comparing the Nash network
for perfect communication in figure 1(A) to the network that evolves with perfect
communication in figure 2(B) and the strict Nash network for imperfect communi-
cation in figure 1(B) to the network that evolves for imperfect communication in
figure 8(B).
In the case of perfect communication, one finds the agents evolving long chains
connecting to the most reliable inquirer who, in turn, usually consults nature. There
is little advantage for a given agent to identify and consult with the most epistem-
ically reliable agent directly. In the case of imperfect communication, however,
one sees the evolution of more compact star networks where a community of social
reliable agents identifies the most epistemically reliable agents and consults those
agents directly. Simple reinforcement learning does not always readily identify the
single most epistemically reliable agent, especially if there other agents with nearly
the same epistemic reliability. It does, however, typically allow those agents with
the required social competence to identify the most epistemically reliable agents
and learn from them. Agents with low social reliability typically evolve to consult
nature directly.
There are two natural extensions of the present models. The first is to introduce
costs for inquiry and allow agents to charge for sharing information. Just as there
might be costs to checking nature or consulting with another agent, a particularly
reliable agent might come to charge for sharing information or simply be rewarded
for being often consulted. To implement this, one might allow for analog payoffs.
This degree of freedom would also allow one to associate a random distribution of
possible payoffs with each agent for checking nature or consulting another agent.
One might expect such models to exhibit quite different dynamical properties and
equilibria. A second extension would be to allow nature to present the agents with
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different types of problems with heterogeneous agents who exhibit different degrees
of competence for each type of problem. To be successful, the agents would need
to coevolve the ability to identify the type of the problem presented and to consult
agents who are good at solving that particular type of problem. in this case, one
might expect a conditional network to evolve where agents identify different experts
for each type of problem and learn to consult experts accordingly. Since each of
these extensions requires a learning dynamics that is more sophisticated than simple
reinforcement, these models will be discussed elsewhere.
Here we have shown how an epistemic network may spontaneously self-assemble
from the evolving dispositions of even very simple, low-rationality agents. The
resulting epistemic network is well customized to the strengths and weaknesses
of the heterogeneous agents. The most reliable inquirers do nearly as well as they
would simply consulting nature directly, other agents identify the most epistemically
reliable agents and hence do much better then they could possibly do on their own,
and those agents whose social reliability is very low follow their best strategy and
investigate nature directly.
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